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Abstract
Decisions concerning proof of facts in criminal law must be rational because of what is at stake, but
the decision-making process must also be cognitively feasible because of cognitive limitations, and it
must obey the relevant legal–procedural constraints. In this topic three approaches to rational reasoning
about evidence in criminal law are compared in light of these demands: arguments, probabilities, and
scenarios. This is done in six case studies in which different authors analyze a manslaughter case from
different theoretical perspectives, plus four commentaries on these case studies. The aim of this topic is
to obtain more insight into how the different approaches can be applied in a legal context. This will
advance the discussion on rational reasoning about evidence in law and will contribute more widely to
cognitive science on a number of topics, including the value of probabilistic accounts of cognition and
the problem of dealing with cognitive biases in reasoning under uncertainty in practical contexts.
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1. Motivation
In the context of criminal law, decisions concerning legal proof of facts must be rational
because of what is at stake, but the decision-making process must also be cognitively feasi-
ble because of the decision-makers’ cognitive limitations, and it must obey the relevant
legal–procedural constraints. The aim of this topic is to compare three approaches focusing,
respectively, on arguments, probabilities, and scenarios, in light of these demands. All three
approaches acknowledge that evidence cannot provide watertight support for a factual
claim, as there is always room for doubt. Probabilistic approaches account for this by apply-
ing Bayesian probability theory, argumentative approaches emphasize the comparison of
supporting and attacking arguments, and scenario approaches advocate the comparison of
alternative scenarios about what may have happened.
In this topic (combinations of) the three approaches are compared in six case studies in
which different authors analyze a manslaughter case from different theoretical perspectives.
In addition, the topic contains four comments on specific case studies. The aim of centering
the topic on the study of a particular case is to obtain more insight into how the different
approaches can be applied in a legal context. Thus we hope to advance the discussion on
theories of rational reasoning about evidence in legal cases. In addition, the topic aims to
more widely contribute to cognitive science on a number of topics. It relates to the recent
interest in probabilistic models as alternatives to deductive models of cognition (Chater,
Tenenbaum, & Yuille, 2006) and more specifically to attempts to develop a Bayesian the-
ory of argumentation (Hahn & Hornikx, 2016; Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Harris, Hahn,
Madsen, & Hsu, 2016). It also relates to the literature on cognitive biases in reasoning
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), since it is known that reasoning under uncertainty is espe-
cially prone to such biases. The issue of the cognitive feasibility of the various approaches
relates to the study of “smart heuristics” for decision-making (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999).
Among other things, the question arises whether argumentation or scenario approaches are
cognitively feasible alternatives to strict Bayesian thinking.
2. Theories of rational criminal proof
The study of principles of rational legal proof arguably started with the ground-breaking
work of the American legal scholar John Henry Wigmore (Wigmore, 1931). While his con-
temporaries exclusively focused on doctrinal analysis of evidence law, Wigmore wanted to
develop a “science” of legal proof. His “scientific” approach was further developed since
the 1970s by several Anglo-American legal scholars called the new evidence scholars
(Lempert, 1986), using a range of methods from various disciplines. In the 1980s and
1990s, psychologists became interested in the topic and the increasing importance of foren-
sic evidence (e.g., DNA and fingerprint databases) made statisticians and forensic scientists
more interested, advocating mainly probabilistic approaches. Finally, since 2000, research-
ers from artificial intelligence and law have applied various AI models to legal proof.
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The various approaches to legal proof thus each have their roots in a particular disci-
pline—artificial intelligence (AI), mathematics, philosophy, psychology, legal theory—
and hence the literature on the topic is very diverse and interdisciplinary, touching on a
wide range of subjects such as the relations between different approaches, their philo-
sophical or mathematical foundations, their cognitive feasibility, and their legal plausibil-
ity. Three main approaches can be distinguished: arguments, probabilities, and scenarios
(Verheij et al., 2016). All three approaches acknowledge that evidence cannot provide
watertight support for a factual claim, as there is always room for doubt.
Probabilistic approaches account for this by applying probability theory (Dawid,
2005). Probabilistic approaches have been central to much of the research on proof, par-
ticularly when the probabilities can be determined based on “hard” data (e.g., DNA and
fingerprint databases). Often a Bayesian approach is taken (Fenton & Berger, 2016). In
its simplest form, so-called Bayes’ Rule is applied, according to which the conditional
probability of the evidence given the hypotheses (the likelihood ratio) and the prior prob-
ability of the hypotheses (i.e., their probability before taking any evidence into account)
are used to compute the posterior probability of the hypotheses given the available evi-
dence. A limitation of this approach is that it is only feasible if the various pieces of evi-
dence can be assumed to be statistically independent, an assumption which in practice is
often not warranted. Accordingly, there is increasing use of Bayesian networks (de Zoete,
Sjerps, Lagnado, & Fenton, 2015; Fenton, Lagnado, & Neil, 2013; Fenton & Neil, 2011;
Hepler, Dawid, & Leucari, 2007; Vlek, Prakken, Renooij, & Verheij, 2014), which over-
come this limitation by using graph theory to graphically represent statistical indepen-
dence relations. Bayesian networks are state of the art in AI, and many software
packages exist for creating Bayesian networks and computing with them.
However, probabilistic approaches are by no means uncontroversial. A theoretical
objection, stemming from the field of epistemology, is that criminal proof is about justi-
fied belief, or warrant, and that probabilities are not the same as degrees of (justified)
belief (Cohen, 1977; Pollock, 2007b). For example, in probability theory, it is hard to dis-
tinguish between ignorance and uncertainty: Assigning a probability of 50% to a state-
ment says much more than “I don’t know.” Moreover, it has been argued that the
“weight” of evidence (in that the probability of a hypothesis given a large body of evi-
dence is better justified than the same probability given just a small subset of the evi-
dence) cannot easily be represented in a probabilistic way. Alternative numerical
accounts of degrees of (justified) belief have been proposed, such as the theory of belief
functions (Shafer, 1976) and possibility theory (Dubois & Prade, 1988). However, these
theories have never become popular in the study of criminal proof, possibly since they
share with probability theory some other problems. A psychological objection to probabil-
ity theory is that for nonspecialists Bayesian thinking is very difficult and counterintuitive
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Thus, probability theory seems to impose a standard of
rationality that cannot be attained in practice, so that their application would lead to
more, instead of fewer, errors (Lempert, 1986). Related psychological concerns are that
using probability theory may “dwarf” softer types of evidence in that only easily quantifi-
able forms of evidence will be considered, or that the mathematical form of a testimony
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gives the misleading impression of objectivity, or that the presentation of small numbers
like random-match probabilities can easily mislead judges or jurors (Tribe, 1971). Finally,
a practical objection against probability theory (and numerical alternatives) is that in legal
cases the required numbers are usually not available, either because there are no data or
because experts or judges are unable or reluctant to provide estimates of probabilities.
This leads to the practical problem of how fact finders can make probability estimates in
a reliable way. Below we will see that the alternative approaches strongly rely on com-
monsense knowledge in the form of generalizations. However, it is not straightforward to
turn such qualitative generalizations into quantitative conditional probabilities.
A second approach takes arguments, more specifically, series of inferences from evi-
dence to conclusions, as the main concept. This approach goes back to Wigmore’s charting
method for legal proof (Wigmore, 1931). The idea of this method is that making the vari-
ous inferences in an argument explicit allows one to identify sources of doubt in these
arguments. Wigmore’s charting method was modernized in the 1980s and 1990s by the
new evidence scholars (Anderson & Twining, 1991; Kadane & Schum, 1996; Schum &
Tillers, 1991), who, among other things, paid special attention to the dual nature of gener-
alizations: They are the glue that hold evidential arguments together, but they are also
important sources of doubt in these arguments, since they can have exceptions or be based
on subjective judgment or even prejudice (Twining, 1999). Therefore, comparing conflict-
ing arguments is as important as constructing arguments. The argument-based approach
has been formalized in terms of AI frameworks for argumentation (Bex, Prakken, Reed, &
Walton, 2003), which include arguments and counterarguments in a logical model of argu-
ment-based attack and defeat. The basic ideas behind the argumentation approach are wide-
spread and widely accepted, and they have been used in diverse areas such as
communication theory, logic, philosophy, and law (van Eemeren et al., 2014). Furthermore,
lawyers and judges are familiar with the idea of argumentation. Thus, argumentation seems
to be a more natural approach to rational proof than probability theory. However, a prob-
lem is that argumentative reasoning does not explicitly allow for the construction and com-
parison of alternative scenarios as a way of maintaining overview of a mass of evidence.
Precisely this is a strong point of the third approach to evidence and proof: the scenar-
io approach (sometimes also called the story-based or narrative approach), which states
that fact finders should construct and compare alternative explanations of the evidence.
Empirical research (Pennington & Hastie, 1993) suggests that when dealing with a mass
of evidence, it is much easier for people to construct scenarios that explain the evidence
instead of building the arguments based on evidence as expressed by, for example, Wig-
more charts. Wagenaar, van Koppen, and Crombag (1993) gave a normative twist to Pen-
nington and Hastie’s story model in their “anchored narratives” theory, based on the
premise that fact finding in criminal procedures should take the form of constructing and
comparing alternative scenarios about what may have happened. The scenario that best
explain the evidence should, if it does so to a sufficient degree, be accepted as true. In
their theory, generalizations have an equally central role as in argumentation approaches
in that scenarios should be anchored in common sense generalizations, which should be
critically examined on their acceptability. This, together with the requirement to compare
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alternative scenarios on their explanatory power, should mitigate the psychological danger
that plausible and persuasive but false scenarios are accepted.
The scenario approach is arguably the most cognitively feasible in that it best describes
how people actually reason when confronted with a lot of evidence. However, the norma-
tive and formal aspects of the scenario approach, both of which should be clearly defined
in any rational theory of proof, are the least developed of all three main approaches. One
link with normative theories of evidential reasoning is through the requirement to test
which scenario best explains the evidence. In this sense, scenario approaches are closer to
probabilistic than to argumentation-based approaches, since this comparison is similar to
the likelihood ratio of Bayes’ rule. Alternatively, scenario approaches can be seen as
applications of philosophical theories of inference to the best (Lipton, 2004). Several AI
researchers have formalized aspects of the scenario approach with logical AI formalisms
for abduction, which essentially is inference to the best explanation (Bex, 2011; Joseph-
son, 2001; Poole, 2001). An explanation-based approach to legal proof has also been
advocated by the American legal scholars Pardo and Allen (2008), although not with a
focus on scenarios. Finally, Thagard (2004) has modeled the scenario approach with his
connectionist computational theory of explanatory coherence, claiming that it avoids the
number problem that is inherent in using Bayesian networks (see also Amaya, 2009). An
interesting question is whether these various approaches are pragmatic approximations of
Bayesian probability theory or whether they model something intrinsically different than
probability (Lipton, 2004).
The last decade has seen quite a few attempts to compare and integrate the different
approaches. Bex (2011) has combined a scenario and argumentative approach in a formal
“hybrid theory.” The connection between ideas from argumentation and Bayesian net-
works has been studied by, among others, Kadane and Schum (1996). The connection
between scenarios and Bayesian networks has also received attention recently (Vlek,
Prakken, Renooij, & Verheij, 2016). Moreover, van Koppen (2011) has proposed a
rational foundation of his scenario approach in terms of Popper’s philosophy of science.
Finally, several studies address the issue of comprehensibility of Bayesian networks.
Work on using so-called idioms (Fenton et al., 2013) or templates for crime scenarios
(Vlek et al., 2014) aims to support the construction of Bayesian networks, while Timmer,
Meyer, Prakken, Renooij, and Verheij (2017) study the extraction of arguments from
Bayesian networks in order to explain these networks to judges or prosecutors.
3. Debating models of rational proof—The Simonshaven case study
In 2015, we organized a 3-day workshop at the Zentrum f€ur Interdisciplin€are Forschung
(Centre for Interdisciplinary Research) in Bielefeld, Germany, and invited legal scholars
and practitioners, computer scientists, philosophers, and cognitive scientists. Follow-up
workshops were organized at the Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematics in Cambridge,
England, in 2016 and at Queen Mary University London, England, in 2017. In Bielefeld,
the idea arose to model a real legal case using the various approaches, in order to compare
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their strong and weak points. For this purpose, a Dutch manslaughter case (the “Simon-
shaven” case) was chosen. The various analyses were made on the basis of English transla-
tions of the Court ruling in the first instance, the prosecutor’s and defense’s arguments on
appeal and the court of appeal’s decision (available as Appendix S1 to this topic). During
the workshop in Cambridge, initial draft analyses of the case were discussed and new ver-
sions were discussed at the workshop in London. This topic presents the final versions of
the case analyses.
The Simonshaven case concerns the death of a woman called Jenny Lourens,1 who was
violently killed in a recreational area near the village of Simonshaven, close to Rotterdam,
while walking there with her husband, Ed Lourens. The couple were known to have had
marital problems and were living apart at the time of the events. The trial court convicted
Ed Lourens of manslaughter on his wife by intentionally hitting and/or kicking her head
and strangling her. It did so on the basis of circumstantial evidence and several witness tes-
timonies about Ed’s earlier verbal and nonverbal aggressive behavior and his relationship
with Jenny. Ed maintained his innocence throughout the case and claimed that someone
had suddenly jumped out of the bushes and had knocked him unconscious; when he woke
up, he found his wife lying next to him, dead. After having made this statement as a wit-
ness, Ed became a suspect in this case and from then on he appealed to his right to remain
silent. Some time after the conviction by the lower court, new evidence came up that
another man had attacked and killed three other women in the same area. A map of the area
with several crosses near the murder scenes was found at the killer’s home and at some of
these locations a pit was found. An accomplice stated that the killer used these pits as hid-
ing places. New investigations were carried out, but no evidence linking the killer to Jen-
ny’s death was found. Ed appealed against his conviction but was convicted again.
A few things are noteworthy about the Dutch criminal-law system. First, as a civil law
system, it is inquisitorial in nature, which means that courts actively investigate the facts
of the case. In this respect, civil law systems differ from most common law systems,
which are adversarial in nature. Another difference with most common law systems is
that Dutch criminal law does not have a jury system; cases are wholly decided by profes-
sional judges. Finally, again unlike many common law systems, Dutch criminal law has
very few rules of evidence. Therefore, courts are relatively free in their decisions about
the relevance and weight of evidence and about the proof of facts.
We next discuss the nature of the case studies and this topic. Anderson and Twining
(1991, pp. 120–121) argue that anyone who analyzes a legal case on its evidential aspects
must declare his or her standpoint by answering three questions: Who am I? In what
stage of what process am I? What am I trying to do? We will answer these questions for
all authors of the case studies.
3.1. Who are we?
We are all academics interested in theories of how to rationally prove facts in a criminal
court case. We have had academic training in law (Dahlman, Van Koppen, Mackor, and
Prakken), philosophy (Dahlman, Mackor, and Prakken), psychology (Van Koppen and
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Lagnado), mathematics (Fenton, Neil, and Verheij), computer science (Yet), or AI (Bex).
Some of us have experience as an expert witness in court (Dahlman, Fenton, Van Koppen,
and Prakken) or in assisting parties involved in a court case (Dahlman and Fenton). Several
of us have given tutorials to judges on rational criminal proof (Dahlman, Fenton, Van Kop-
pen, Mackor, and Prakken). One of us has been a jury member (Fenton). None of the other
authors has ever been a crime investigator or a fact finder in court procedures.
3.2. In what stage of the process are we?
We are at a stage at which the formal court proceedings have closed. In carrying out
our case studies, we were not under any real time or institutional pressure of the kind
experienced by crime investigators or fact finders in criminal-legal procedures. We hypo-
thetically put ourselves in the position of the fact finders at the trial and offer an analysis
of their verdict and the evidence from different theoretical perspectives.
3.3. What are we trying to do?
We are analyzing the quality of the reasoning of the court of appeal in the Simon-
shaven case when justifying its decision to convict. As such, we are not investigating
how the court should think and reason but how it should justify its decision. We do this
in terms of a particular theory of rational proof. Some of these theories are formal in that
they use mathematical tools; other theories are informal. Most of us apply a theory which
we believe to be appropriate for its purpose. An exception is Henry Prakken’s argumenta-
tion-based analysis, which was made to have an analysis of this kind for the purpose of
comparison. The main aim of our case studies is not to find out the truth about the case.
This would require access to the complete case files, which we did not have. Moreover,
it would require expertise about various aspects of the case (such as ballistic evidence,
DNA evidence, and reliability of eye witnesses), which we (with some exceptions on par-
ticular points) do not have. Accordingly, our selections of scenarios or generalizations,
and our probability or preference estimates have no objective status, while the same holds
for the conclusions of our case studies about the question whether the court’s conviction
of the suspect was rationally justified. Instead, the main aim of the case studies is to
obtain insight into the theoretical and practical strengths and weaknesses of our respective
methods when applied as a reasoning model in criminal court cases. Since we are post
hoc analyzing the quality of the court’s reasoning, our insights are primarily on the merits
of the methods for analyzing evidential reasoning and at best only indirectly on the merits
of the methods for performing evidential reasoning as a fact finder.
The authors of the case studies were asked to explicitly answer the following ques-
tions:
• To what extent is the analysis objective and to what extent is it based on subjective
beliefs, assumptions, and choices?
• How natural is the analysis from a cognitive and legal point of view?
H. Prakken, F. Bex, A. R. Mackor / Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (2020) 1059
• Did your analysis identify errors or biases in the reasoning of the judge, prosecutor,
or defense?
• Does your analysis respect the legal constraints, such as the burden and standard of
proof and the right to remain silent?
Of course, the case studies do not provide final answers to these questions, not in the
least given their just-mentioned limitations. Nevertheless, we hope that our topic will sig-
nificantly advance the ongoing debate, since so far there have been no systematic com-
parisons of the three approaches in an actual substantial case.
4. The papers and commentaries in this topic
Henry Prakken gives an argumentation-based analysis of the case. He uses formal tools
developed in AI, namely, the ASPIC+ framework for specifying arguments and their rela-
tions, and a version of the theory of abstract argumentation frameworks for evaluating
the arguments. The analysis is graphically displayed in a way that is similar to Wigmore
charts. Prakken regards evidential argumentation as the construction and attack of “trees
of inference” from evidence to conclusions by applying generalizations to evidence or
intermediate conclusions. The outcome of his analysis is not a conclusion on whether the
accused was guilty but a list of relevant issues on which a (possibly reasoned) choice for
one of two conflicting arguments influences such a conclusion. He argues that the main
benefits of the argumentation approach are that it clearly shows how evidence and
hypotheses relate and what are the points of disagreement in a case. He acknowledges
that weak points are the lack of overview over a case and the lack of a systematic
account of degrees of uncertainty. Finally, he claims that his analysis is not far from how
the court justified its decision but that he filled in many reasoning steps that the court left
implicit, and in these steps the court may have reasoned in a scenario-based or even
Bayesian way but left this implicit in its justification.
Norman Fenton et al. present a detailed Bayesian network analysis of the case, using
their previously developed set of building blocks (“idioms”) for legal applications of
Bayesian networks. They claim that the relatively short time it took the authors to build
their analysis indicates that their idioms approach can facilitate the construction of Baye-
sian networks, which are often claimed to be hard to build. Their network yields a poste-
rior probability of guilt of 74%. The authors acknowledge that this outcome is relative to
the subjective nature of their judgments but they claim that their sensitivity analysis
(which investigates the effect of variations in their probability estimates) increases the
confidence in this outcome, since it shows that their model is reasonably robust to varia-
tions and that the posterior probability of guilt generally remains below the 95% which
they claim to be the threshold for conviction. The authors also claim that the use of their
idioms approach further reduces the subjectivity of their design decisions, as does their
new opportunity-based method for estimating the prior probability of guilt (which is often
claimed to be a hard problem). The authors also acknowledge some weaknesses of their
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model, such as that they left some evidence out. They further acknowledge that their
Bayesian network model may not be as easily accessible as scenario- or argumentation-
based modelings but they still claim that a Bayesian approach models the standard
approach to legal proof, which is to continually revise beliefs under new evidence.
Another claimed advantage of a Bayesian approach is that it provides an explicit proba-
bility of guilt, which they believe is the ultimate requirement in reaching a verdict in
legal cases.
Christian Dahlman analyzes the case with a generalized version of Bayes’ rule that
can handle dependencies. Sometimes when Dahlman regards pieces of evidence E and E0
as dependent, he estimates the likelihood ratio of E relative to the guilt and innocence
hypotheses plus E0. And sometimes he groups several pieces of evidence that he regards
as dependent on each other together in a bundle of evidence and then treats the bundle as
one piece of evidence. This approach is mathematically correct but does not allow a very
precise analysis of the interdependencies. Thus Dahlman sacrifices some expressiveness
compared to Bayesian networks in order to gain on cognitive feasibility.
Dahlman claims that the use of this method can help a fact finder avoid three kinds of
bias in probabilistic reasoning—false dichotomy (assuming that the two compared
hypotheses exhaust the space of possibilities), dependence neglect (neglecting statistical
dependencies between pieces of evidence), and miss rate neglect (disregarding the proba-
bility of a piece of evidence given the innocence hypothesis). He claims to have identi-
fied occurrences of all three kinds of bias in the (trial and appellate) courts’ decisions.
The outcome of Dahlman’s case study is that the posterior probability of the guilt
hypotheses fails to satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Dahlman
acknowledges that this is relative to his own subjective estimates. Finally, he acknowl-
edges the danger that a mathematical analysis may give a false impression of objectivity
to fact finders, but he claims (like Fenton et al. in their case study with Bayesian net-
works) that an advantage of the mathematical form of his analysis is that it forces him to
make his assumptions explicit, which can then be scrutinized.
Peter Van Koppen and Anne Ruth Mackor apply their version of the scenario approach
to the case. First they further explicate and expand this approach in several ways. They
explicitly link it to inference to the best explanation and to theories of explanatory coher-
ence, and they expand the approach in order to accommodate the difference between
explaining known facts and predicting novel facts. This distinction is important in the
Simonshaven case, since the defendant stated from the beginning that a madman who
jumped from the bushes had killed his wife. Whereas this claim seemed very implausible
at first, evidence about a madman jumping out of the bushes in other cases shed a new
light on his claim. Van Koppen and Mackor claim that a strong point of their approach is
that it is feasible from a cognitive point of view since it stays close to descriptive theories
of evidential reasoning. They acknowledge that their approach can be further developed
and be made more precise, but they want to keep it informal, so that legal professionals
can apply it.
Floris Bex analyzes the case in an informal version of his hybrid theory. In this theory,
(alternative) hypothetical scenarios, Bex calls them "stories," are constructed to explain
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important observations in the case, similar to the scenario approach. However, a key dif-
ference with that approach is that arguments based on evidence are used to reason about
these alternative stories: Stories can be anchored in evidence by supporting them with
arguments, or stories can be attacked by arguments based on evidence. Stories and argu-
ments are thus used in a dialectical process, where critical questions (e.g., “is the story
plausible?”; “is there an alternative explanation?”; “are there arguments that support or
attack the story?”) lead to (alternative) stories and (counter-) arguments. Bex starts by
presenting one possible story, and then proceeds to ask and answer such questions, ending
up with three alternative stories and more than 50 arguments. The case study shows that
the story supporting conviction is better than the two stories supporting acquittal and, per-
haps more importantly, that Ed never answered some of the critical questions brought
against him in the case. Bex argues that the main strength of the hybrid theory is that it
provides the best of both worlds: Cognitively feasible story-based reasoning is combined
with more detailed rational argument-based reasoning. A weak point of the hybrid theory
is that, like the argument-based approach, it does not provide a systematic account of
uncertainty.
Finally, Bart Verheij analyzes the case with his own recently developed case model
formalism, which was designed to connect arguments, scenarios, and probabilities in one
approach, and to bridge quantitative and qualitative analytic styles. Case models represent
what can be the case in a set of logical formulas, each representing a case. Scenarios can
be expressed as cases conjoining evidence and hypotheses. The cases in a case model are
ordered by a preference ordering, which can but need not express a probability distribu-
tion. Arguments are a pair (premises, conclusion) and are evaluated given a case model
(unlike the formalisms used by Prakken, which evaluate arguments in light of their inter-
action with conflicting arguments). An argument is coherent if there is a case in which
both its premises and conclusion holds. It is presumptively valid if its conclusion holds in
the maximally preferred cases of those in which its premises hold. And it is conclusive if
its conclusion holds in all cases of those in which its premises hold. Verheij has similar
definitions for when a scenario is coherent, plausible, or beyond a reasonable doubt.
The outcome of Verheij’s analysis is that the guilty-as-charged scenario is beyond rea-
sonable doubt, but Verheij notes that his aim was not to give his own analysis of the case
but to reconstruct the court of appeal’s reasoning (which led to conviction) in his formal-
ism. Verheij claims that this modeling is natural in that it models the gradual develop-
ment and evaluation of scenarios in light of evidence. Verheij also claims that since the
case models have a probabilistic interpretation, the use of his formalism prevents proba-
bilistic reasoning errors, while yet there is no need to express probabilities on all ele-
ments of his model (thus addressing the number problem). Verheij acknowledges that his
formalism pays less attention to the internal structure of arguments and scenarios than
alternative argumentation and scenario approaches.
Our topic also contains four commentaries. Ronald Meester comments on the papers of
Fenton et al. and Dahlman, which both take a Bayesian approach. Meester elaborates on
what he thinks are limitations of Bayesian approaches in the context of criminal proof.
Marcello di Bello comments on Prakken’s argumentative and Van Koppen and Mackor’s
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scenario approach. He argues that both these approaches face difficulties since they lack
an account of plausibility, in particular of degrees of support. Frank Zenker makes similar
observations in his comment on Bex’s hybrid combination of these approaches. Zenker
also comments on Verheij’s approach, claiming that it promises to bridge qualitative and
quantitative accounts but is not easy to use for those not trained in logic. Finally, Paul
Roberts suggests that the main use of Van Koppen and Mackor’s scenario approach may
lie not in trial stages but in the investigative and preparatory stages of criminal adjudica-
tion, especially in jury-based systems. About Dahlman’s Bayesian approach, he acknowl-
edges its usefulness in exposing probabilistic reasoning fallacies but warns that it is far
removed from how fact finders in criminal cases actually reason.
5. Concluding remarks
In our concluding remarks, we first summarize the authors’ answers to the four ques-
tions each paper was meant to address.
To what extent is the analysis objective and to what extent is it based on subjective
beliefs, assumptions, and choices? Prakken and Dahlman acknowledge the subjectivity of
their modelings, while Bex and Verheij say they have attempted to reconstruct the appeal
court’s reasoning. Van Koppen and Mackor claim that their reliance on commonsense
knowledge, which can be incorrect, makes their modeling neither fully subjective nor fully
objective. Fenton et al. also claim some degree of objectivity for their modeling, based on
the outcome of their sensitivity analysis and their use of idioms and the opportunity-prior
method. The latter method is an interesting result of our topic, separately published as Fen-
ton, Lagnado, Dahlman, and Neil (2017). Interestingly, Dahlman, who is a co-author of the
latter paper, did not use the method in his Bayesian analysis. If he had done so, his posterior
probability might well have been above his threshold for proof beyond reasonable doubt.
How natural is the analysis from a cognitive and legal point of view? Bex and Van
Koppen & Mackor claim that the centrality of scenario construction makes their respec-
tive methods practically applicable, although Van Koppen and Mackor note that some-
times direct reasoning from evidence to hypotheses (as allowed by the argumentation part
of Bex’ hybrid approach) may be more natural than the explanatory style of reasoning in
a purely story-based approach. Prakken recommends empirical research on this issue in
the context of witness testimony. Both Fenton et al. and Dahlman acknowledge that their
Bayesian approaches may be difficult to apply in practice, but Dahlman claims that
applying his version of the method is worth the effort while Fenton et al. claim that their
approach still models the general process of evidential legal reasoning. Verheij makes a
similar claim and also claims that his integration of arguments, scenarios, and probabili-
ties balances the strengths of each. Finally, five of the six case studies apply formal mod-
els. While formality may increase precision, it clearly reduces practical usability since
legal practitioners are not used to using formal methods. For this reason, two of these five
case studies (Bex and Prakken) make use of visualization techniques to make their analy-
ses more understandable, while Fenton et al. claim that the “powerful” visual appeal of
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Bayesian networks makes them potentially natural in legal contexts. This highlights the
issue of whether the use of visualization techniques, possibly supported by software, can
improve legal evidential reasoning (Tillers, 2007).
Did your analysis identify errors or biases in the reasoning of the judge, prosecutor, or
defense? Dahlman, Fenton et al., and Verheij claim that their respective methods can avoid
probabilistic reasoning errors, but only Dahlman gives examples from this case study. Bex,
Van Koppen and Mackor, and Prakken criticize the court’s reasoning on various specific
points of detail. We note that their respective methods all involve the comparison of con-
flicting arguments and/or scenarios, which may help avoiding confirmation bias.
Does your analysis respect the legal constraints, such as the burden and standard of
proof and the right to remain silent? Finally, all authors claim that their methods and
analyses generally respect the legal constraints. In addition, Fenton et al. claim that Baye-
sian approaches can give a precise interpretation of the beyond-reasonable-doubt proof
standard. Van Koppen and Mackor note that their view on confirmed risky predictions
may be at odds with the right to remain silent.
How should all these claims be evaluated? We recall that any insights obtained by the
case studies are primarily on analyzing and only indirectly on performing evidential rea-
soning. Moreover, our case study experiment was not meant to be a controlled experi-
ment, suitable to yield formally valid and reliable conclusions. Instead, in our opinion, its
main value lies in how it can advance the continuing debate on models of rational legal
proof. Now six detailed case studies are available of a real case, which can be used by
other researchers in their research. Moreover, the authors’ own comments and those of
the four commentators are arguably valuable contributions to the ongoing debate, since
these comments are made in the context of a realistic case study experiment.
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